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ABSTRACT 
 
What is the best way to recruit public servants? Governments all over the world have the last dec-
ades pondered that question, as parts of increasing attempts to reform civil services and public 
administrations. Two opposing alternatives can be distinguished: on one hand, traditional civil ser-
vice recruitment, centralized, through formal examinations, with low discretion and flexbility for 
managers. On the other hand, private sector-style recruitment that is faster and more flexible, al-
lowing managers to pick the candidates most suitable for each position. 
 
In this paper, I test the hypothesis that the context determines which institution that will deliver the 
highest level of meritocracy (in the sense that skills and ability actually are the decisive factors). 
More specifically, when the risk for patronage is low, private sector style-recruitment can be at-
tempted to find the best candidates, but when the risk instead is high, formal public sector style-
recruitment is preferable to prevent patronage and nepotism. Analysis of a dataset containing in-
formation about the structures and characteristics of bureacracies in over 100 countries lends sup-
port to the hypothesis. 
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Introduction 
An effective public administration that is free from corruption is necessary to implement govern-
ment policies and stimulate economic and human development (Mauro 1995; Holmberg, Rothstein 
and Nasiritousi 2009). For this reason, international organizations such as the World Bank have 
increasingly emphasized civil service and administrative reform in their development programs 
(Evans 2008). One of the most important aspects of civil service reform is the recruitment of pub-
lic servants, which has been shown to matter both for economic growth and for corruption preven-
tion (Rauch 1995; Evans and Rauch 1999; Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell 2012). While it is self-
evident that the public sector would benefit from recruiting the best and the brightest, the way to 
design procedures that achieve such an outcome is less clear. 
 
The recruitment procedure associated with traditional bureaucracies is to evaluate candidates ac-
cording to formal examinations regulated by civil service laws. Proponents of the ―New Public 
Management‖ have however criticized the rigidity and lack of flexibility inherent in traditional civil 
service recruitment practices. Many countries have therefore decentralized hiring authority and 
allowed managers more flexibility, bringing methods of recruitment in public sector organizations 
closer to those used in the private sector (Laegreid and Wise 2007). 
 
While the New Public Management ideas now no longer are in vogue to the same extent as earlier 
(Dunleavy et al 2006), it is clear that recruitment practices traditionally associated with the private 
and public sectors have different strengths and weaknesses. The trade-off is to a large extent be-
tween a system with much discretion for recruiters which potentially is vulnerable to patronage and 
clientilism, and a system of rigid recruitment guided by formal examination systems which instead 
may fail to pick up the best talent, as formal examinations never can be optimally designed (Miller 
2000). 
 
Which one is better? The answer is probably that neither could be applied successfully to all coun-
tries and organizations. There is no ―one size fits all‖ solution, not in recruitment, nor in any other 
area of public administration (see Grindle 2004; Pritchett and Woolcock 2004). This does not how-
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ever mean that there are no common trends and that reformers of one system have nothing to 
learn from the study of other contexts. Instead, an important task for researchers must be to identi-
fy the conditions under which institutions work more or less well. 
 
The hypothesis of this paper is that when the risk for patronage and nepotism is high, a more regu-
lated recruitment process based on formal examinations is preferable, to ―tie the hands‖ of recruit-
ers. When the risk for patronage instead is low, private sector-style practices may instead provide 
the flexibility required to find the best candidates for each position. However, if more flexibile re-
cruitment without formal examinations is attempted when there are few other safeguards against 
patronage (such as a free media and an independent judiciary), the likely result is that recruiters and 
political parties will distribute public jobs to unqualified persons for patronage. 
 
This hypothesis is tested on a cross-national dataset of expert evaluations of bureaucratic structures 
(Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell 2011). Using an indicator of the the level of meritocracy in the 
outcome of the recruitment process as the dependent variable, I find that several countries that to 
little extent use formal examinations, but have many other safeguards against patronage, exhibit 
some of the highest levels of meritocracy in recruitment. Countries that do not have formal exami-
nations nor other safeguards in contrast instead show the lowest levels of meritocracy in the out-
comes of the recruitment process. Countries that to a large extent rely on formal examinations are 
found foremost on the upper half of the meritocracy scale, regardless of the presence or absence of 
other safeguards against patronage. In other words, a positive effect of formal examinations on 
meritocracy is only found in countries with few other safeguards against patronage. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the theoretical section, I describe the role of patronage in re-
cruitment and how formal competitive examinations relate to meritocracy. I then proceed to dis-
cuss factors affecting the incentives to engage in patronage, and the factors that discourage it. In 
the subsequent section, data and methods are described. Results are then presented, and the ro-
bustness of the empirical findings are tested. The final section concludes the paper. 
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Theory 
Let me introduce the theoretical section by posing a question: why is patronage much more wide-
spread in Nicaragua than in New Zealand? In the data (presented in the data and methods section), 
Nicaragua and New Zealand emerge as the two countries where formal examinations are used to 
the least extent in the recruitment process. However, they can be found on the exact opposite ends 
of the scale for meritocracy in the outcomes of the recruitment process. In Nicaragua, the skills and 
experience of applicants to jobs in the public sector play a small role. 
Instead, ―entry into public administration and career progress are strongly influenced by political or 
clientilistic criteria //…// because no regulatory framwork governs these processes‖ (Echebarría 
and Cortázar 2007:151). 
 
In New Zealand, skills and merits of the applicants mattered more for recruitment than in any oth-
er country except Hong Kong. But the explanation is apparently not a strict framework for re-
cruitment, rather, New Zealand is usually described as the country where New Public Management 
reforms have gone furthest (Christensen and Laegreid 2011). Hiring is highly decentralized: the 
official jobs portal of New Zealand states that ―Each State sector organisation advertises for and 
appoints its own staff below the position of chief executive, according to its needs. All vacancies 
must be advertised and appointments made on the basis of the impartial selection of suitably quali-
fied people. The application process //…// can vary between organisations.‖ (New Zealand Gov-
ernment Jobs Online 2012). 
 
In both countries, there is little centralization and regulation regarding the process of recruitment to 
the public sector. The outcomes of the processes are however radically different. In Nicaragua, 
patronage and clientilism prevail, while New Zealand enjoys a high level of meritocracy, where each 
government organization is able to recruit the candidates best suited for its needs. The intuitive 
explanation for why that is case is that the risk that politicians and bureaucrats will engage in pat-
ronage is much lower in New Zealand than in Nicaragua. The answer as to why that in turn is the 
case is probably not that New Zealanders generally are better people or that Nicaraguans are inher-
ently corrupt, but because of the quality of institutions and viability of the democratic culture in 
New Zealand, that safeguard against patronage. More flexible regulation and less formalization of 
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the recruitment process can in that context be allowed.1 In the following, I first provide an over-
view of patronage and formal examinations in recruitment, and then proceed with an attempt to 
operationalize (some of) the factors that relate to the risk for patronage in a country. 
 
Patronage and formal examinations 
Historically, strict meritocratic recruitment to public offices has been a rare phenomena. Mann 
(1993:445-446) outlines four alternative ways of obtaining an office: through heritage, election, 
purchase or patronage. Only in the 19th and 20th centuries did meritocratic recruitment increase in 
importance in the ―western world‖, but in China tests on knowledge of classical texts for prospec-
tive bureaucrats where held as early as 134 B.C. (Elman 2000).2  
 
Patronage has instead been a very common method of appointment historically, and continues to 
be an important factor in electoral democracies.3 The perhaps most well-known example is the 
American spoils system of the 19th century, in which the party in power could distribute public jobs 
freely to political supporters, which obviously impairs meritocracy in recruitment, as ‖parties quite 
naturally give decisive weight not to expert considerations but to the services a follower renders to 
the party boss.‖ (Weber 1968:961).4 
 
In a report to the British parliament about the organization of the Civil Service, Stafford Northcote 
and Charles Trevelyan claimed that ‖numerous instances might be given in which personal or polit-
                                                     
1 A similar argument has been put forward by Allen Schick (1998), who argues that most developing countries not 
should try New Zealand’s management reforms as their economies are too informal to cope with the high levels of 
flexibility and discretion. 
2 The imperial exams, held from the 7
th
 century and onwards, have even been argued to have influenced civil service 
reformers in the western world (Zeng 1999). 
3 The origins of the term can be traced to ancient Rome, where plebeians were allowed to choose a patron from among 
the patricians. The patrician was obliged to take care of the plebeian, for instance by providing money in need or repre-
senting him in court. In return, the plebeian was required to for instance contribute to the patrician’s daughter’s dowry, to 
ransom the patrician if taken hostage, and support the patrician politically (Roniger 1984). 
4 A striking example of how this system lead to the recruitment of incompetent persons can be found in a report to the 
United States Congress in 1868, that found that the employees of the US Treasuries Office not only included former 
accountants, lawyers and bankers, but also a housekeeper, a sculptor and a washerwoman, to name a few examples 
(Hoogenboom 1959). 
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ical considerations have led to the appointment of men of very slender ability, and perhaps of ques-
tionable character, to situations of considerable emolument, over the heads of public servants of 
long standing and undoubted merit.‖ (Northcote and Trevelyan 1854:7) Patronage of this kind was 
the primary target of the 19th century civil service reformers in Great Britain and the United States. 
In Britain reform was initiated by the aforementioned Northcote-Trevelyan Report in 1854 and in 
the United States after the assassination of President James Garfield by a disappointed jobseeker in 
1881. Both in Britain and the United States, the response to the widespread patronage was to intro-
duce formal, competitive examinations for entry into the civil service, in the US after the Pendleton 
Act of 1883 and in Britain after the founding of the Civil Service Commission in 1855. 
 
How then, do formal competitive examinations work in practice? In some cases, they include a 
written test designed to test the abilities of the applicants, in general (for instance arithmetic or 
language) or for the specific position (technical skills). According to a report of the US Merit Sys-
tems Protections Board in 1999, 40 percent of the competitive hires, which account for about 60 
percent of all hires, was made on the basis of written tests, mostly for lower level positions (U.S. 
Merit Systems Protections Board 1999). In other cases, the competitive examination consists of a 
formalized scoring of the candidate‘s experience and training, which can be automated or manual. 
The common denominator is that the candidates are ranked according to their score on the exami-
nation, and the highest ranked are usually employed. In the U.S., the recruiters can often only 
choose between the three highest scoring candidates. In an alternative procedure, the examinations 
only measure whether the candidate pass a certain threshold, and recruiters can then choose among 
the candidates who passed the threshold (Lewis 2008). Interviews can also be included as a compo-
nent in the competitive examination process. 
 
The defining feature of the system of formal examination is that it lowers the discretion available 
for recruiters. In the extreme, recruiting is centralized. On Northcote and Trevelyans recommenda-
tion, a Central Board of Examiners was for example instituted in Britain to remove hiring decisions 
from the managers, as ―a large proportion of the persons appointed to a public department usually 
consists of young men in whose success the heads of the office or the principal clerks take a lively 
personal interest, owing to relationship or some other motive connected with their public or private 
position‖ (Northcote and Trevelyan 1854). 
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Two objections can however be raised to a formalized recruitment: that it is unable to sort out the 
most able candidates, and that is is too rigid and inflexible. An example of the first problem can be 
taken from the tests to the British Indian Civil Service in the 19th century. Originally, civil servants 
were exclusively recruited from graduates of the Haileybury College. Admission to the college re-
quired nomination, which required the patronage of the Directors of the East India Company 
(Moore 1964). To end this, parliament decided that recruitment should take place through open 
competitive and formal examination. In the first years of the competitive exam most of the success-
ful test-takers held a degree from Oxford or Cambridge, which was the intended effect of the test. 
But in the following years, the share of Oxbridge applicants fell markedly. The reason was that the 
academic institutions provided specialized educations – classics in Oxford and mathematics in 
Cambridge – while the exams required shallower knowledge on a wider range of subjects. Training 
specifically tailored to the exams was instead provided by ―crammers‖, private tutors where stu-
dents during a short period of time tried to cram in factual knowledge (Dewey 1973). Instead of 
attracting the best and the brightest, the civil service exams during this period attracted young men 
without a university education, but with a propensity for cramming. Only after several decades of 
tinkering with the test structure was the desired traits of the applicants obtained (Dewey 1974). 
 
An indication that formal examinations not were optimal in sorting out the best applicants also in 
the US can be found in the New International Encyclopedia of 1905 which under the ―merit system‖ 
heading states that ―A common objection to the merit system is that it does not give an adequate 
test of a man's real capacity to administer the office to which he seeks appointment.‖ (The New 
International Encyclopedia 1905). Similar tendencies are also evident in the modern world where 
written examinations are required for entry into the civil service, such as India, where entire towns 
dedicated to cramming for tests to the civil service or top schools have sprung up (Sullivan 2010).  
 
The second problem is that formal competitive examinations may reduce discretion in recruitment 
to the point of extreme rigidity. In the United States from the 1960‘s and 1970‘s, public opinion as 
well as scholars started to see the public bureaucracy as rigid and ineffictive. A survey in 1978 
found that only 18 percent thought that the civil service attracted the most able persons, and only a 
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tenth thought that the bureaucracy was free of corruption (Lewis 2008: 44). Federal agencies in the 
US have now long asked for more flexibility in hiring, promoting and firing personnel to improve 
performance, to ―respond more quickly to changes in the job market, agency personnel needs, and 
new programmatic responsibilities‖ (Lewis 2008: 25) and the evidence shows that the same trend is 
evident also in state and local governments (Hamilton 2010). President Obama in 2010 also 
launched a Hiring Reform aimed at simplifying the Federal hiring process, arguing that ―the com-
plexity and inefficiency of today‘s Federal hiring process deters many highly qualified individuals 
from seeking and obtaining jobs in the Federal Government‖ (Obama 2010). Proposed reforms 
include eliminating essay-style questions in applications as well as a greater involvement of manag-
ers in the hiring process, but the perhaps most telling suggestion is that selection should be allowed 
not only from the three applicants with the highest rank on the competitive exam, but from appli-
cants in a wider category. This clearly signals a low trust in the ability of the formal examinations to 
sort out the most able candidates. 
 
Similar patterns are observable all over the world in the form of the New Public Management para-
digm, which emphasizes the value of private sector practices in management of public bureaucra-
cies, including greater flexibility and decentralization of hiring practices, under the slogan ―Let the 
managers manage‖ (cf. Osborne and Gaebler 1992). For instance, executive search (commonly 
known as ―headhunting‖) of candidates for top positions in corporations entails extreme discretion 
for recruiters, as they not are constrained in any way, and even can pursue candidates that have not 
even applied for the job in question. 
 
If high discretion and flexibility in recruitment work in the private sector, why should it not in the 
public sector? I argue that the major difference between the public and private sector is that of 
ownership. Private companies are owned by the stock holders, represented through the board of 
directors. They delegate the daily operation of the company to the CEO, but hold the CEO ac-
countable for the performance of the company. If the CEO would use the high discretion in re-
cruitment to appoint incompetent friends or relatives to important positions, this would hurt the 
performance and lead to lower profits, and the board would hold the CEO accountable. In public 
bureaucracies, performance is not as easily measured (as is evident from the vast literature on con-
tracting out of public services; c.f. Brown and Potoski 2003a; 2003b), and the accountability mech-
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anisms are less direct. The most important safeguard against abuse of the high discretion is thus not 
present in the public sector. 
 
I argue that the choice of level of discretion in recruitment must be guided by an assessment of the 
risk of patronage and nepotism if high discretion is allowed. The risk logically depends on the in-
centives to engage in patronage, as well as the available safeguards against it. If the risk is low, flexi-
ble hiring practices can be risked to pick up the best talent. If the risk instead is high, it is more 
important to guard against patronage by lowering discretion. Depending on the circumstances, 
different institutions can thus lead to more or less meritocracy in recruitment. The trade-off is 
summarized neatly in the entry for ―merit system‖ in The New International Encyclopedia of 1905: 
―…the system must be recognized as a power for good. Though it does not inevitably lead to the 
choice of the most competent, it does very effectually exclude the absolutely unfit — the political 
trickster and dealer in votes.‖ In the empirical section, I test the hypothesis that formal examina-
tions increase meritocracy in recruitment more when other safeguards against patronage are lacking, 
but not so when those safeguards are in place. 
 
Factors increasing the risk for patronage 
Factors that increase the risk that patronage can be sorted under two headings – incentives for 
patronage, and those that deter from doing so by increasing the risk that corrupt practices will be 
exposed and sanctioned. 
 
Incentives for using and not using patronage 
Why is patronage used? The classical understanding is that patronage jobs are dispensed in return 
for political favors, as suggested by Weber (1968). The many examples of political machines in US 
Cities, as well as a statistical analysis of the incumbency advantage in elections to state legislatures 
before and after civil service reform (Folke, Hirano and Snyder 2011) indicate that patronage in-
deed can be an effective tool to win elections, which makes it attractive for incumbent govern-
ments. However, Barbara Geddes (1991) has theorized that as political competition increases and 
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there is a risk that the incumbents need share the spoils of patronage with other, a system of pat-
ronage becomes increasingly unattractive. In Geddes model, there is a cost of supporting patronage 
when the public is opposed to it. The opposition can however in some cases reap the benefits of 
patronage while still opposing it publicly. In this situation, the incumbent has an incentive to re-
form, according to Geddes. A similar hypothesis is put forth by Anirudh Ruhil and Pedro Camoes, 
who also find that merit systems in US state governments to a larger extent were adopted by gover-
nors facing stiffer electoral competition (Ruhil and Camoes 2003). A high degree of political com-
petition should thus be associated with a lower risk for patronage. 
 
Other scholars have challenged the electoral effectiveness of patronage. In a survey of highway 
workers who received their jobs through patronage in Pennsylvania, Frank Sorauf (1956) found 
that while the workers had contributed minor sums to the party in power, they did little campaign 
work and did not vote loyally. Indeed, some of them were actually unaware that their position was 
―political‖. In a study of patronage in New Haven, Connecticut, Michael Johnston (1979) argued 
that jobs were a blunt tool for gathering political support, as they neither are easily divisible nor 
retractable. Furthermore, since the number of available patronage jobs often is small, they need to 
be distributed effectively to districts were electoral competition is thought to have the best effect. 
Calculating which those districts are, often many months in advance of the election, is difficult. 
Johnston accordingly found that the distribution of patronage jobs not did correspond to what 
could be expected from a vote-maximizing political calculus. Instead Johnston argued that the pat-
ronage jobs in this case were distributed to rally support from a specific ethnic group, Italian-
Americans. Patronage structured along ethnic lines can also be found in other parts of the world, 
such as in the ethnically organized parties of India (Chandra 2007). A high degree of ethnic frac-
tionalization in a country should thus be expected to lead to a higher risk for patronage. 
 
A third factor relating to the incentives for using patronage concerns the alternative cost of patron-
age. James Hollyer (2011) argues that one of the major costs of patronage is that it excludes compe-
tent persons from positions in the bureaucracy, which impairs efficiency. The political benefit of 
employing a person through patronage must hence be weighed against the efficiency loss stemming 
from not giving the most qualified person the job. However, if few good candidates are available, 
for instance when the average level of education among candidates is low, this alternative cost is 
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also low, which makes patronage more attractive. Hollyer studies the timing of reforms toward 
meritocratic recruitment in Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries, and find that they become more 
likely after education had become more widespread. A low average level of education in a country 
should thus be associated with more patronage. 
 
Risk for exposure and sanction 
Proponents of more at-will recruitment and laxer procedures in hiring have argued that patronage 
in most cases is outlawed, and thus not a grave risk (Hamilton 2010). But in order for a law to have 
effect, crimes need to be discovered, exposed and sanctioned. We should hence expect that the risk 
for patronage is highest when institutions that facilitate the exposure and sanction of abuse are 
lacking, of which I will include two. 
 
First, media plays an important part in the exposure of abuse in the public bureaucracy, and is more 
often than not responsible for the exposure of corruption scandals, epitomized by the Watergate 
scandal, where two journalists brought down a US president. If recruiters know that there is a risk 
that patronage will be exposed by the media, they are more likely to refrain from it. However, this 
will not happen if media is controlled by the state. A free and independent media is therefore likely 
to reduce the risk for patronage. Second, exposing infractions is however not enough. There needs 
to be an enforcer that can punish the infractions as well, namely an efficient and independent judi-
ciary system. When political pressure routinely is put on the judiciary, patronage (at least at higher 
levels of government) can be practiced with less risk. An independent judiciary should thus reduce 
the risk for patronage. 
 
There are of course other factors that could affect the risk for patronage, for instance the degree of 
corruption in the public administration, but the factors chosen here are chosen to minimize the risk 
of endogeneity in the statistical model, which will model meritocracy as an outcome of the extent to 
which formal examinations are used, conditioned by the risk for patronage. For instance, as meri-
tocracy is expected to reduce corruption (Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell 2012; Rauch and Evans 
2001), using it as an interaction variable with formal examinations would introduce endogeneity. 
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Furthermore, the existence of patronage is probably included in many measures of corruption that 
build on expert ratings of countries.5 Of the variables used in the paper, the variable that is most 
vulnerable to this critique is the indicator for independence of the judiciary, as strategic appoint-
ments of loyal supporters in key positions can be a powerful way of controlling the judicial system. 
However, the other variables are clearly not affected in the same way (most obviously when it 
comes to ethnic fractionalization). If the main results are similar regardless of the choice of condi-
tioning factor, there is less reason to suspect that results are distorted by endogeneity. 
 
In sum, I have in the theoretical section argued that there are two threats to meritocracy in recruit-
ment of public personnel: political influence in recruitment, and inefficiency in finding good candi-
dates. The choice of bureaucratic recruitment procedures is a trade-off between insulation against 
patronage and flexibility in finding the most suitable candidates. For instance, drawing lots among 
candidates will ensure that political influence on the process will become void, but such an ar-
rangement also entails the risk that utterly incompetent persons will be appointed. A more realistic 
arrangement is a formal examination system, either through written tests or other impersonal evalu-
ation of candidates, which can act as a safeguard against patronage, but also lead to less flexibility. 
Whether formal examination systems actually will have the effect of increasing meritocracy in re-
cruitment thus depends on whether the risk for patronage is high or low. If the risk is high, a for-
malized recruitment process with little discretion for recruiters will likely lead to increased meritoc-
racy in recruitment outcomes, as political influence is decreased. However, if the risk for patronage 
is low, formalizing recruitment will likely only have the effect of leading to more rigidity and admin-
istrative burden without a gain in meritocracy. 
 
Empirical strategy and data 
To test the hypothesis time series data on countries before and after reforms of recruitment proce-
dures would be optimal. Comparative data on bureaucratic structure is however extremely scarce, 
with the only two existing (to the best of my knowledge) data sources being cross-sectional datasets 
                                                     
5 Still, an analysis using corruption as an interaction variable yields the same results as the other analyses presented in 
this paper. Formal examinations only have a positive impact on meritocracy in recruitment in corrupt countries, as ex-
pected from theory. 
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collected by Evans and Rauch (1999) and by the Quality of Government Institute (Dahlström, 
Lapuente and Teorell 2011). The Evans and Rauch data has received the most attention (the QoG 
data being much more recent) but covers a much smaller sample, only including developing coun-
tries. The Evans and Rauch data does moreover not include a variable for meritocracy in the out-
come of the recruitment process, which is the main focus of this paper. I will therefore use the 
QoG data.6 The approach in the QoG survey is similar to that used by Evans and Rauch, namely to 
ask country experts to give their opinion of the bureaucratic structure in the country of interest. 106 
countries are covered in the dataset, with a mean of 7.7 respondents for each country.7 Only coun-
tries with three or more respondents are included in the sample. 
 
The dependent variable is the degree of meritocracy in recruitment, measured as the country aver-
age of the answer to a question where the respondents are asked to evaluate how often the follow-
ing statement applies: ‖When recruiting public sector employees, the skills and merits of the appli-
cants decide who gets the job?‖. Respondents answered on a seven-point scale, ranging from 
‖Hardly ever‖ to ‖Almost always‖. The question thus captures the level of meritocracy in recruit-
ment, regardless of the procedures used. To further test the robustness of the results, an alternative 
survey question will also be used: ―When recruiting public sector employees, the political connec-
tions of the applicants decide who gets the job?‖. The variables are obviously related, but are slight-
ly different. Meritocracy in recruitment consists both of the absence of undue influence over the 
recruitment process, but also of the presence of mechanisms which find the best candidates. The 
first question captures both, but the second question only measures the first part, about undue 
influence. The main independent variable is measured by another item in the same battery, worded 
‖Public sector employees are hired via a formal examination system?‖.8 
 
                                                     
6 The data is publicly available at www.qog.pol.gu.se/data/qogexpertsurveydataset. 
7 However, due to missing data on control and interaction variables, the regression models at most include 98 and at 
the least 92 countries. 
8 When measuring the degree to which formal examinations are used, Evans and Rauch instead asked respondents 
about the proportion of higher officials that entered the civil service via formal examination systems. Four response 
options were available: ”Less than 30%”, ”30 – 60%”, ”60% - 90%” and ”More than 90%”. There is thus a difference both 
in the wording of the question and in the content, as the QoG survey asks about all public employees, and Evans and 
Rauch only about higher officials. The two measures are however highly correlated (R=0.81, p<.000). 
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The hypothesis states that the positive effect of formal examiniations (low discretion in recruit-
ment) is conditional on the risk for patronage in the administration: low discretion is preferred 
when the risk is high, as high discretion can be abused for reasons of patronage. When the risk for 
patronage is low, high discretion is instead preferred to allow recruiters to pick the best candidates. 
The appropriate model is thus a multiplicative one, where formal examinations are interacted with 
the level of risk. Five factors affecting the level of risk were outlined in the theoretical section, three 
relating to the incentives for patronage, and two relating to the risk of exposure and sanction of 
patronage: political competition, ethnic fractionalization, average education levels, freedom of the 
media, and independence of the judiciary. I will now review the empirical indicators used to opera-
tionalize the theoretical variables. 
 
Political competition is often measured in terms of closeness of electoral results, but on a global 
scale a more relevant question is whether different parties actually compete at all. Therefore, the 
Polity ―Competitiveness of participation‖ index is used (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). The index 
measures the degree to which opposition to the government is allowed and practiced, from ―Re-
pressed‖ where no opposition is allowed, to ―Competitive‖ where different groups compete for 
power and regularly transfer it between them. Ethnic fractionalization is measured in the standard 
way, as the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country not will belong to 
the same ethnic group (Alesina et al 2003). The average education level is measured as the percent-
age students enrolled in tertiary education in the five-year age group following the end of secondary 
school, averaged between men and women (UNESCO 2010). 
 
Freedom of the media is in the model measured through the Freedom House indicator ―Political 
pressures and controls on media content‖, which builds on expert judgements on the degree of 
government manipulation of media, censorship, access to information, and more. Independence of 
the judiciary enters the model as a variable from the Political Constraints Index (Henisz 2000; 
2002), that combines information from the Polity Executive constraints index and the International 
Country Risk Guide index of law and order. 
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Several of these variables are indexes, which creates some ambiguity about what actually is being 
measured, and what the causal processes behind correlations are. I have however tried to use the 
most narrowly defined variables available, using for instance only ―independence of the judiciary‖ 
instead of composite indexes of rule of law, which is the best strategy given data limitations. 
 
There is a possibility that both recruitment processes and recruitment outcomes (the degree of 
meritocracy in recruitment) is caused by the existence of good government institutions in general. It 
is therefore necessary to control for variables known to affect the quality of institutions in general. 
Three variables are chosen. The first is economic development, which theoretically through mod-
ernization is expected to lead to a demand for better institutions, and which alsoo have been shown 
empirically to correlate strongly with good institutions (Treisman 2007). The second is a dummy 
variable for whether the country has a legal tradition of common law, which is expected to lead to a 
more flexible legal framework, and could thus be expected to correlate both with good institutions 
and recruitment procedures (La Porta et al 1999). The third variable is the Polity Executive Con-
straints index (Marshall and Jaggers 2002), which captures the effect of democracy. The variable is 
chosen instead of more comprehensive democracy indexes to increase clarity about what is being 
measured. All variables except the main dependent and independent variables are obtained from 
the Quality of Government Dataset (Teorell et al 2011). 
 
In the models presented below, each interacting variable is introduced separately in the model, 
which does not allow me to draw conclusions about which variables that are more important, given 
that they probably are correlated. Including them all in the same model will however not allow 
certain conclusions to be drawn as many terms will be highly collinear. Furthermore, it is not my 
objective to identify one or two specific factors that moderate the impact of formal examinations. 
Good institutions tend to cluster together (Besley and Persson 2011), and the aim of the model is 
to illustrate that in countries where several factors serve to reduce the risk of patronage, formal 
examinations are less effective in creating meritocracy in recruitment than in countries where the 
risk is higher. The five variables discussed here all have significant correlations. To this end, an 
index of the factors affecting the risk for patronage is constructed, by normalizing all five variables 
to range from 0 (lowest observed value) to 1 (highest observed value) and then adding them. The 
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resulting index thus ranges from 0 to 5, where a higher value indicates a higher risk for patronage. 
Summary statistics for all the variables are presented in Appendix Table 1. 
 
Results 
First, I briefly explore the bivariate relationship between the degree to which formal examination 
procedures are used in recruitment in the public sector and the degree of meritocracy in recruit-
ment, that is, the extent to which ability determines who gets a job. In Figure 1, the relationship 
between formal examinations and meritocracy in recruitment (left graph) and the extent to which 
political connections determine who gets a job (right graph) is presented. 
 
FIGURE 1. SCATTERPLOTS OF THE RELATION BETWEEN FORMAL EXAMINATIONS AND MERI-
TOCRACY IN RECRUITMENT AND THE DEGREE TO WHICH POLITICAL CONNECTIONS MATTER IN 
RECRUITMENT. 
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The correlation between formal examinations and the degree of meritocracy in recruitment is as 
expected positive and statistically significant, but not very strong (R=0.33). Similarly, the correlation 
with the extent to which political connections matter is negative (R=-0.28) and significant.  
 
I now proceed to test whether the effect of formal examination systems is conditioned on the fac-
tors relating to the incentives for patronage, and the safeguards against it. The hypothesis is that 
when the risk for patronage is high, formal examinations have the most beneficial effect. In Table 
1, the results of the analysis are presented in six models – first without any conditioning factors, 
and then with one interaction variable at a time, to avoid problems of multicollinearity, and finally 
with the risk index. 
 
Model 1 shows that the positive effect of formal examinations evident in Figure 1 holds while con-
trolling for the constraints on the executive, economic development and the common law tradition. 
Economic development is as expected positively correlated with meritocracy in recruitment, as is 
common law. There is however no statistically significant correlation between constraints on the 
executive and meritocracy in recruitment. 
 
The hypothesis is tested in Models 2-6 through the size, sign and statistical significance of the inter-
action terms. All terms are significant at conventional levels of significance, and have the expected 
sign, except for political competition. Formal examinations have a more positive effect on meritoc-
racy in countries with little political competition, high degrees of ethnic fractionalization, lower 
average education levels, in countries that to do not have an independent judiciary and in countries 
where political pressure on media is higher. That is, countries where the risk for patronage is ex-
pected to be higher. The highest t-value for the interaction term is found when using the combined 
index of all the other factors as the interaction variable, possibly indicating that it not only is one 
single factor, but a combination that increases or decreases the risk for patronage. 
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TABLE 1. ESTIMATION RESULTS. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: MERITOCRACY IN RECRUITMENT. 
OLS ESTIMATION, UNSTANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS, T-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Formal examination 0.240*** 0.851*** 0.018 0.520*** 0.380*** -0.036 -0.208* 
 (3.91) (3.68) (0.15) (4.86) (4.54) (-0.33) (-1.79) 
Executive Constraints  -0.002 -0.024** -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.031*** -0.022** 
 (-0.28) (-2.05) (-0.11) (-0.32) (-0.76) (-3.21) (-2.39) 
Ln(GDP/cap) 0.092*** 0.082*** 0.081*** 0.064*** 0.082*** 0.066*** 0.047** 
 (6.06) (5.38) (4.57) (3.10) (5.48) (4.37) (2.51) 
Common law 0.105*** 0.101*** 0.111*** 0.115*** 0.099*** 0.086*** 0.111*** 
 (3.41) (3.45) (3.47) (3.85) (3.44) (3.17) (3.94) 
Competitiveness of 
Participation 
 0.150*** 
(3.72) 
     
Formal examination × 
Competitiveness 
 -0.171*** 
(-2.84) 
     
Ethnic fractionalization   -0.388**     
   (-2.22)     
Formal examination × 
Ethnic fractionalizat-
ion 
  0.549** 
(2.07) 
    
Average education    0.007***    
    (3.84)    
Formal examination × 
Average education 
   -0.008*** 
(-3.16) 
   
Independent Judiciary     0.270***   
     (3.73)   
Formal examination × 
Independent judiciary 
    -0.338*** 
(-2.87) 
  
Political influence on 
media 
     -0.018***  
      (-5.16)  
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Formal examination × 
Political influence on 
media 
     0.016*** 
(2.89) 
 
Risk index       -0.177*** 
(-5.58) 
Formal examination × 
Risk index 
      0.172*** 
(3.76) 
Constant -0.406*** -0.741*** -0.168 -0.402** -0.411*** 0.288* 0.529*** 
 (-3.44) (-4.18) (-0.94) (-2.55) (-3.24) (1.73) (2.39) 
R
2
 0.456 0.527 0.483 0.558 0.535 0.596 0.622 
N 98 97 97 94 98 98 92 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
My interpretation of the results is thus that formal examinations with strict regulations of recruit-
ment are necessary to counter patronage in countries where the risk for patronage is high, while it is 
less so elsewhere. In Figure 2, the marginal effect of formal examinations is presented at different 
values of the interaction variables, from the minimal observed value to the maximal observed value. 
The dashed lines denote the 95 percent confidence interval. 
 
Since both the independent variable and the dependent variable have been normalized to range 
from 0 to 1, the effect presented indicates the difference between countries where formal examina-
tions ―Hardly ever‖ are used and countries where they ―Almost always‖ are used. The strength of 
the interaction effects are substantial. For instance, when political competition is at its lowest, the 
effect of formal examinations exceeds 0.5, while it is 0 at the highest level of political competition. 
The interaction effect of ethnic fractionalization is similar – from no effect at the lowest observed 
level of ethnic fractionalization to 0.5 at the highest level. It should however be noted that the ef-
fect of formal examinations never is negative and statistically significant, as both confidence inter-
vals never pass below zero. Formal examinations thus seem to be effective in many countries, and 
simply superfluous in some countries, but never harmful for meritocracy in recruitment, according 
to the models. 
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FIGURE 2. MARGINAL EFFECT OF FORMAL EXAMINATIONS ON MERITOCRACY IN RECRUITMENT 
AT DIFFERENT VALUES OF THE INTERACTION VARIABLES, FROM MINIMAL OBSERVED VALUE 
TO MAXIMAL OBSERVED VALUE.  
 
I now turn to an analysis in which the survey indicator of whether political connections matter in 
recruitment instead of meritocracy in recruitment as the dependent variable. Results are bound to 
be fairly similar, as the two variables naturally are highly negatively correlated (R=-0.84). Still, there 
are some differences between the two concepts, as other factors than the influence of political con-
nections can impair meritocracy, for instance ethnic discrimination. The relationship between the 
two variables is presented in Figure 3. 
 
To illustrate that political influence in the recruitment process not is perfectly negatively correlated 
with meritocracy in recruitment, I will briefly discuss two examples. The country where political 
connections is deemed to have the least influence is Japan, but the meritocracy in recruitment to 
the Japanese public sector estimated at a level comparable to that of Spain or India, where political 
connections are much more important. One possible explanation could be the alleged dominance 
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of the Law Department of Tokyo University among elite bureaucrats and politicians – a large share 
of Japanese prime ministers have been graduates, and Setsuo Miyazawa and Hiroshi Otsuka (2000: 
15) show that Tokyo law graduates that pass the entrance exams are more than twice as likely to 
actually become employed: ―In fact, Tokyo graduates can work in an environment, which is almost 
an alumni organization of the University of Tokyo and can feel more confidence in their future, 
whereas those from other universities are constantly reminded that they are minorities and do not 
have the same supporting networks among elite bureaucrats.‖ In the Japanese case, it seems that it 
is bureaucratic connections rather than political connections that matter. 
 
FIGURE 3. SCATTERPLOT OF THE RELATION BETWEEN MERITOCRACY IN RECRUITMENT AND 
THE DEGREE TO WHICH POLITICAL CONNECTIONS MATTER IN RECRUITMENT. 
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An interesting opposite case is China, which is found to the right in the graph. In China, political 
connections are by the country experts considered very important, unsurprisingly, given the inter-
twinement of the Communist Party and the state. More surprising is the fact that the system despite 
that has achieved a respectable level of meritocracy in recruitment, which almost is on par with 
Japan‘s. It appears as if the Communist Party is successful in finding and cultivating talent, illustrat-
ing what Peter Evans (1998:71) has claimed: ‖meritocratic recruitment can be achieved through a 
variety of means.‖ 
 
In Table 2 an analysis identical to the one presented in Table 1 is presented, using the other de-
pendent variable. The main results hold, but the coefficients have opposite signs from Table 1 – 
formal examinations lead to less importance of political connections when there is less political 
competition, more ethnic fractionalization, less average education, no independent judiciary and 
more political pressures on the media. One interesting difference is however that the interaction 
term for ethnic fractionalization is rendered insignificant (even though the point estimate not is 
radically diminished), which makes sense given that ethnic fractionalization is related to patronage 
on ethnical grounds, not political. 
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TABLE 2. ESTIMATION RESULTS. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: POLITICAL CONNECTIONS. 
OLS ESTIMATION, UNSTANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS, T-STATISTICS IN  
PARENTHESES. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Formal examination -0.217*** -0.790*** -0.051 -0.428*** -0.409*** 0.058 0.232 
 (-2.80) (-2.65) (-0.33) (-2.91) (-3.78) (0.40) (1.41) 
Executive Constraints  0.003 0.029* 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.034*** 0.018 
 (0.28) (1.91) (0.22) (0.21) (0.50) (2.66) (1.34) 
Ln(GDP/cap) -0.098*** -0.084*** -0.104*** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.070*** -0.66** 
 (-5.14) (-4.29) (-4.57) (-3.24) (-4.77) (-3.48) (-2.46) 
Common law -0.136*** -0.135*** -0.131*** -0.136*** -0.128*** -0.117*** -0.140*** 
 (-3.50) (-3.56) (-3.19) (-3.31) (-3.44) (-3.24) (-3.48) 
Competitiveness of 
Participation 
 -0.157*** 
 (-3.02) 
     
Formal examination × 
Competitiveness 
 -0.163** 
(-2.10) 
     
Ethnic fractionalizat-
ion 
  0.201     
   (0.90)     
Formal examination × 
Ethnic fractionalizat-
ion 
  -0.420 
(-1.24) 
    
Average education    -0.004*    
    (-1.84)    
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Formal examination × 
Average education 
   0.006* 
(1.85) 
   
Independent Judiciary     -0.303***   
     (-3.23)   
Formal examination × 
Independent judici-
ary 
    -0.427*** 
(2.81) 
  
Political influence on 
media 
     0.019***  
      (4.05)  
Formal examination × 
Political influence 
on media 
     -0.016** 
(-2.16) 
 
Risk index       0.160*** 
(3.55) 
Formal examination × 
Risk index 
      -0.174*** 
(-2.68) 
Constant 1.562*** 1.857*** 1.539*** 1.659*** 1.626*** 0.817*** 0.801*** 
 (10.46) (8.13) (6.73) (7.64) (9.91) (3.70) (2.55) 
R
2
 0.373 0.433 0.389 0.408 0.438 0.487 0.463 
N 98 97 97 94 98 98 92 
 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
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Figure 4 presents the marginal effects of formal examinations at different levels of the interaction 
variables, as in Figure 2. The slopes are reversed compared to Figure 2, but are otherwise similar. 
Formal examinations have a statistically significant effect in all countries but the ones with the best 
safeguards against patronage, where it has an effect indistinguishable from zero. 
 
FIGURE 4. MARGINAL EFFECT OF FORMAL EXAMINATIONS ON THE DEGREE TO WHICH POLITI-
CAL CONNECTIONS MATTER IN RECRUITMENT AT DIFFERENT VALUES OF THE INTERACTION 
VARIABLES, FROM MINIMAL OBSERVED VALUE TO MAXIMAL OBSERVED VALUE.  
 
Robustness and alternative explanations 
One possible objection to the results of the empirical analysis is that both the dependent variables 
and the independent variables stem from the same expert survey, which possibly could create an 
artificial correlation between the two variables. An alternative analysis is therefore conducted. In 
the regular analysis presented above, the average expert score for the country on the dependent 
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variable is regressed on the average expert score for the country on the independent variable. In the 
alternative analysis, the unit of analysis is instead individual experts. 
 
The dependent variable is the expert‘s rating of the dependent variable, but the independent varia-
ble is instead of the expert‘s own rating the average of the other country experts‘ rating. In this way, 
the dependent variable and independent variable is disconnected, as for each unit of analysis, dif-
ferent persons have scored the independent and the dependent variable. Results are presented in 
the Appendix (Tables 2 and 3), and show that all the results are substantively unchanged, which 
indicates that correlations indeed are driven by the underlying characteristics of the countries, ra-
ther than by the characteristics of the country experts. 
 
A more serious objection relates to the degree to which formal examination systems stipulated by 
the law are used in practice. It is conceivable that some countries have comprehensive systems for 
competitive examinations, for instance requiring written tests, but that these examinations are cir-
cumvented. The infamous ―Malek Manual‖, written by officials during the Nixon administration in 
USA, detailed strategies for politicizing the bureaucracy without breaking the law (Lewis 2008). 
Similarly, South Korea in the 1950‘s had systems for competitive examinations, but the vast majori-
ty of new hires were ―special appointments‖ which were exempt from the merit system (Cheng, 
Haggard and Kang 1998: 105). A risk is then that the country experts in the survey have rated the 
degree to which formal examination systems actually are used in practice in recruitment, rather than 
the extent to which they are required by law. This would mean that the distance between the de-
pendent and independent variable becomes very small, as both variables measure de facto meritoc-
racy. 
 
One indication that this alternative explanation not is the entire story is however given by the mod-
est unconditional correlation between the two variables, which is illustrated in Figure 1. As the 
correlation only appears in subgroups of countries, it would appear that the two variables not simp-
ly measure the same underlying concept. Moreover, it is unfortunately impossible to adress this 
problem given the data currently at hand. A task for future research is to collect objective data on 
whether laws for formal examinations are in place, and study to which extent these laws correlate 
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with the extent to which formal examinations actually are used, and with the degree of meritocracy 
in recruitment. 
 
Conclusion 
The structure and quality of the bureaucracy is paramount in the quest for less corruption and bet-
ter governance. To this end, meritocratic recruitment of public officials has been put forth as an 
important step. However, it is far from certain that institutions traditionally associated with merito-
cratic recruitment, most importantly formal examinations, actually lead to a high level of meritocra-
cy. In many cases, formal examinations lead to cultures of cramming for written tests, and lack of 
flexibility in the light of new challenges. This has lead to calls for adoption of recruitment practices 
traditionally associated with the private sector, where more discretion is allowed to recruiters. Such 
practices are however more easily abused for reasons of patronage and nepotism. It is therefore 
necessary to investigate under which conditions formal recruitment lead to meritocracy in recruit-
ment. 
 
I have here argued that formal examinations are preferrable when there are few other safeguards 
against patronage, as formal examinations act as a check on patronage and nepotism. When safe-
guards are in place, the risk that recruitment practices that allow for more discretion will be abused 
is lower, and more discretion in recruitment can then lead to more flexibility and lower administra-
tive burden. Formal examinations thus appear to be a less riskier strategy than more flexibile re-
cruitment – countries that have open recruitment include both the most and the least meritocratic 
in the world, as the examples of New Zealand and Nicaragua show. With formal recruitment, the 
worst excesses of patronage are more likely to be avoided, but it is perhaps not in all instances pos-
sible to find the most suitable candidates. It should be noted that while the effect of formal exami-
nations in some cases is predicted to be negative, the negative effect is never statistically significant. 
But even if the effect is zero, the case for using formal examinations would seem weak, as it is a 
slower and more complicated procedure, whose biggest advantage is improved meritocracy and 
protection from patronage. If that advantage is non-existent, a less cumbersome system would 
seem preferrable. 
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The policy implications are thus in line with the literature that criticizes standardized solutions to 
governance problems in different contexts. Countries plagued by corruption and dysfunctional 
bureaucracies would not do well by simply emulating the recruitment practices of countries that 
today are successful, as the context is entirely different (Schick 1998). However, as pointed out by 
Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock, ―‘one size fits all‘ does not mean that ‗any size fits all‘ or 
‗anything goes;‘ without guidance as to which size fits which, it is merely a platitude.‖ (Pritchett and 
Woolcock 2004:193) Research on which bureaucratic structures that prevent corruption and pro-
mote development should move towards delimiting the conditions under which different institu-
tions and policies function better or worse. This paper is only a first step – instead of one ―size‖ I 
discuss two, but future empirical research can further elaborate on the the appropriate ways to re-
cruit public servants in different circumstances. For now, the conclusion is that flexible and more 
easily administered recruitment practices may be appropriate in countries with several safeguards 
against patronage and nepotism, that is, countries that resemble New Zealand. However, if the 
country instead resembles Nicaragua more and those safeguards are lacking, a more rigid system of 
formal examinations will instead do more to promote meritocracy in recruitment. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS. 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Meritocracy in recruitment 92 0.55 0.18 0.15 0.92 
Political connections in recruitment 92 0.55 0.21 0.11 0.94 
Formal examinations 92 0.58 0.22 0.11 0.97 
Executive constraints 92 5.52 1.91 1.00 7.00 
Ln(GDP/Cap) 92 8.82 1.04 6.36 10.51 
Common law 92 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Competitiveness of participation 92 3.75 1.18 1.00 5.00 
Ethnic fractionalization 92 0.39 0.23 0.00 0.93 
Average education 92 35.36 23.20 1.00 86.00 
Independence of the judiciary 92 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Political influence on the media 92 16.05 10.06 1.00 36.00 
Risk index 92 2.24 1.25 0.18 4.43 
Comment: Summary statistics are presented for the 92 countries which have complete data on all variables. In the regression 
models, the maximum number of countries possible are used in each model. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 2.  
ESTIMATION RESULTS, INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANALYSIS. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 
MERITOCRACY IN RECRUITMENT. OLS ESTIMATION, UNSTANDARDIZED COEF-
FICIENTS, T-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES. STANDARD ERRORS CLUSTERED 
ON COUNTRY. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Formal examination 0.213*** 0.933*** -0.073 0.482*** 0.368*** -0.076 -0.214** 
 (2.89) (4.08) (-0.59) (5.58) (4.94) (-0.63) (-2.27) 
Executive  
Constraints  
0.001 -0.029*** 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.030*** 
 (1.14) (-3.09) (1.21) (-1.21) (0.79) (0.60) (-3.14) 
Ln(GDP/cap) 0.111*** 0.103*** 0.088*** 0.086*** 0.093*** 0.085*** 0.060** 
 (8.60) (6.11) (6.47) (4.30) (5.29) (5.45) (2.50) 
Common law 0.136*** 0.128*** 0.160*** 0.147*** 0.132*** 0.122*** 0.146*** 
 (4.47) (4.34) (5.90) (6.86) (5.43) (4.61) (6.62) 
Competitiveness of 
Participation 
 0.164*** 
(3.96) 
     
Formal examination 
× Competitiveness 
 -0.193*** 
(-3.28) 
     
Ethnic fractionalizat-
ion 
  -0.564***     
   (-2.94)     
Formal examination 
× Ethnic fractional-
ization 
  0.692** 
(2.56) 
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Average education    0.006***    
    (3.64)    
Formal examination 
× Average educa-
tion 
   -0.007*** 
(-2.89) 
   
Independent Judici-
ary 
    0.289***   
     (2.66)   
Formal examination 
× Independent 
judiciary 
    -0.359** 
(-2.55) 
  
Political influence on 
media 
     -0.014***  
      (-3.87)  
Formal examination 
× Political influ-
ence on media 
     0.017*** 
(3.21) 
 
Risk index       -0.179*** 
(-7.02) 
Formal examination 
× Risk index 
      0.165*** 
(4.63) 
Constant -0.605*** -0.961*** -0.171 -0.595*** -0.563*** -0.135 0.465* 
 (-5.36) (-5.14) (-1.02) (-3.66) (-3.62) (-0.80) (1.80) 
R
2
 0.274 0.306 0.299 0.314 0.314 0.312 0.355 
N 981 944 978 939 981 981 906 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX TABLE 3.  
ESTIMATION RESULTS, INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANALYSIS. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 
POLITICAL CONNECTIONS MATTER IN RECRUITMENT. OLS ESTIMATION, UN-
STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS, T-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES. STANDARD 
ERRORS CLUSTERED ON COUNTRY. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Formal examination -0.198*** -0.962*** 0.041 -0.419*** -0.436*** 0.134 0.267* 
 (-2.63) (-3.64) (0.24) (-4.02) (-6.39) (0.95) (1.80) 
Executive 
Constraints  
-0.002*** 0.031** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.002*** -0.002** 0.025* 
 (-4.43) (2.31) (-4.83) (-1.19) (-3.94) (-2.40) (1.97) 
Ln(GDP/cap) -0.120*** -0.102*** -0.105*** -0.114*** -0.107*** -0.092*** -0.076*** 
 (-7.38) (-5.13) (-6.86) (-4.47) (-6.25) (-5.19) (-3.18) 
Common law -0.165*** -0.162*** -0.180*** -0.167*** -0.160*** -0.149*** -0.169*** 
 (-4.82) (-4.84) (-5.38) (-5.62) (-5.55) (-4.76) (-5.44) 
Competitiveness of 
Participation 
 -0.181*** 
(3.56) 
     
Formal examination 
× Competitiveness 
 0.207*** 
(2.93) 
     
Ethnic fractionalizat-
ion 
  0.445*     
   (1.93)     
Formal examination 
× Ethnic 
fractionalization 
  -0.584 
(-1.66) 
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Average education    -0.004***    
    (-2.20)    
Formal examination 
× Average educat-
ion 
   0.006* 
(1.84) 
   
Independent Judici-
ary 
    -0.343***   
     (-4.27)   
Formal examination 
× Independent 
judiciary 
    0.493*** 
(4.03) 
  
Political influence on 
media 
     0.016***  
      (4.38)  
Formal examination 
× Political influ-
ence on media 
     -0.019*** 
(-3.32) 
 
Risk index       0.179*** 
(5.33) 
Formal examination 
× Risk index 
      -0.187*** 
(-3.36) 
Constant 1.801*** 2.126*** 1.488*** 1.900*** 1.846*** 1.288*** 0.826*** 
 (13.46) (9.50) (7.67) (8.95) (12.17) (7.24) (3.09) 
R
2
 0.257 0.277 0.271 0.277 0.298 0.295 0.309 
N 976 939 973 934 976 976 901 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
